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ABSTRACT

Natural-resource security is an increasingly important area of international affairs.
While there is a great deal of cooperation at the international level between actors with a
stake in shared natural resources, there is also contention. Military and security issues can
arise out of the coming together of nations over natural resources. A waterway or
reservoir that is abutted by one or more nations can be problematic. This study seeks to
clarify processes surrounding two specific examples of water-resource decision making
involving state and non-state actors. The following questions guide my research: 1) How
do international cooperations focused on water security work? 2) What, in the context of
international cooperations focused on water security, does peace mean? 3) How and to
what extent do these cooperations advance peaceful outcomes for water security? This
thesis intends to develop a greater understanding of cooperation and conflict around
natural resources and also contribute to knowledge about peace processes in this
important area of international affairs.
My methods are based on and build from my social science research experience
with the Future of Dams project which is a National Science Foundation project to
understand and support linking knowledge with decision making about dams. In this
research, I look at media articles to analyze discourse around negotiations and
interactions around shared waters. My case study and cross-case comparison focuses on
two specific cases. The first draws from interactions in the Aral Sea basin where states
are cooperating to deal with the fallout of historically intensive irrigation practices that
decimated the sea. The second focuses on the Penobscot River where a recently

completed dam-removal project is being heralded as a new standard in collaborative
decision making around natural resources. Through my analysis, I discover some general
trends in decision making on shared water resources and how actors can achieve
successful outcomes. These insights arise from considering the similarities and
differences between these two cases.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Water is a vital resource, and one that faces increasing pressures due to many
types of intersecting global changes in ecosystems, economies and societies. Given
human reliance on water, our abilities to collectively govern this important resource are
essential to our survival. Yet cooperation on issues of water sustainability and security is
a complex challenge. On the one hand, “realists” of the world are skeptical that people
are motivated by anything but survival and personal fulfillment. Others, optimistic in
their assessment of the world, identify cooperation as a natural result of humans’
conscious or unconscious realization that the best collective outcomes are achieved when
constituent members give and take, negotiate their differences, and realize common
understandings. Cooperations on an international scale between states, organizations, and
businesses can offer a unique set of analytical challenges to students of global affairs. We
can ask ourselves why people cooperate, what elements of a decision-making process
produce a successful — and peaceful — outcome, and how we can encourage positive
relations. As the 20th century demonstrated and the 21st continues to stress, we live a
world where every day we as distinct collectives of humans are forced into closer
proximity. Many have attributed the shrinking of temporal and effective distance of
communications and relations on Earth to the advent of new technologies which
eliminate historical hurdles to interaction created by geography, but there are other forces
at play that bring our common goods under threat.
Every year, climate change tightens its choke-hold on our shared natural resource,
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and we humans are increasingly forced into the same corner, unable to find solutions
without consulting with and understanding one another. As this process has become a
larger subject of public discourse, climate change has brought about a new interest in the
intersection of environmental studies and international relations. How this process will
affect states on a global scale is a pressing issue in today’s world. Many anticipate a
heightening of tensions, especially in areas where natural resources are already a
contentious issue. Some predict that as humanity waged wars over oil in the late-20th and
early-21st centuries, so too will it wage war over water for the first time in the near future
(Amery, 2002). The future trend is largely agreed upon: international relations in areas
where natural resources are currently stressed will only heat up as time goes on.
In one area of the world, this principle plays out in to a heightened degree. What
once constituted the Aral Sea, now largely a dried-up seabed with rusting hulls protruding
from the dust like crumbling skyscrapers, was the subject of gross human abuse in the
20th century. In need of Uzbek cotton, the central government of the Soviet Union
initiated incredibly intensive irrigation and environmental manipulation projects starting
halfway through the century. Played out over decades, this process harmed the ecosystem
of the region in which roughly 46 million Central Asians live (United Nations, 2011).
Today, actors in the region — predominantly international organizations, businesses, and
the states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia — must reckon with the long-term
instability seeded by this period of mismanagement. These actors have build
infrastructure, negotiated through international forums, and crafted policies to reflect a
shifting regional context. A 2005 dam project bankrolled by the World Bank and Kazakh
government on the Syr Darya River — which feeds into the still waters of the small
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North Aral Sea — was heralded as a success for a region that has faced so many setbacks.
Still, efforts to cooperate are sometimes bogged down by power dynamics, geographical
differences, and political and financial obstacles. The Aral Sea of today is a zone of
dynamic negotiations whose nuances, good and bad, require deep analysis to fully
understand (Elhance, 1997).
At the same time, on the other side of the planet, a recent multi-party river
restoration initiative is being heralded as the new standard for cooperation in
sustainability initiatives. Lasting for more than 15 years, the PRRP saw the coming
together of multiple actors with different agendas and, remarkably, their success in
crafting a solution to issues regarding the Penobscot watershed that all found equitable. In
contrast to the Aral Sea context, whose issues mostly regard the appropriation of
resources, economic changes, and environmental degradation, the Penobscot River’s
major issues concerned habitat restoration, redistribution of ownership of economic
infrastructure, and rectification of past injustices for the indigenous Penobscot Nation
(Roy et al., 2018; Day, 2006).
Taken together, the Aral Sea and Penobscot contexts can tell us quite a bit about
the nature of international interactions over shared water resources. Both include
instances of perceived successes and failures, cooperations, and conflicts. Because they
are so different at their core, they present two distinct examples of international water
resource security, negotiations, and potential outcomes of such processes.
The objective of this project — from a bird’s-eye view — is to compare and
contrast these two contexts. An obvious challenge is that these two cases appear to resist
comparison in many ways. They are distinct geographically, primarily operating at two
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very different scales, one regional and one international; they involve a different set of
international and domestic actors; they take place in two areas whose cultures and
histories bear little resemblance; and they ultimately concern vastly different material
conditions in the form of a sea basin and a river basin. The cases at hand are incredibly
different and defy traditional notions of cross-case study. However, putting different
cases like this in conversation with one another can help yield novel insights about
similarities, differences, and overall patterns (Silka, McGreavy, and Hart). But, as I will
explore in through this study, there is great insight into the nature of international
cooperation and resource security to be gleaned from considering these two seemingly
incomparable cases.
This research is guided by a few research questions. First, to establish a
foundation for further analysis, I ask how international cooperations focused on water
security work. This provides the theoretical context to allow for a more nuanced dive into
the case study materials. I then ask: What, in the context of international cooperations
focused on water security, does peace mean? This question speaks to the heart of any
worthy investigation of international affairs, whether it be related to economic policy,
disarmament, or, indeed, shared natural resources. I am ultimately interested in
understanding how different actors who share or have a vested interest in the same
natural resources can achieve peaceful outcomes through their decision-making
processes. This leads me to my final question: How do these cooperations advance
peaceful outcomes for water security? By asking these questions, I intend to shed some
light on an area of international affairs that is increasingly urgent to address with policy
and recalibrations of macro-scale approaches to shared problems.
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To this end, I have segmented my research. This project begins with a broad
review of literature related to international water resource security, the relationship
between conflict and collaboration, roots of conflict, the Aral Sea context, the Penobscot
River context, and issues of scale. The next section of the project details the case study
methods I used to conduct the research. My primary materials were two databases of
news articles related to the Aral Sea and Penobscot River. I chose to analyze news
articles in part because I saw the effectiveness of such methods when I helped conduct a
news discourse analysis of the PRRP during a previous research project. Analyzing such
documents, I found, was helpful in understanding events, their ramifications, and
peoples’ opinion around those events. Using the coding software NVivo, I was able to
investigate common themes through these two cases and also where they diverge in
important ways. The next component of the paper is a combined results, discussion, and
analysis section. I base the structure of this section on my three principal research
questions and include a short quantitative analysis to help visualize and quantify some of
the results I obtain from coding. In my conclusion, I summarize the results of this
process, discuss some of the limitations of my research, and suggest potential directions
to take this work in the future or what more information might be needed to form a
holistic picture of the issue.
As a whole, this project seeks to do a few things. First, it is my own personal
endeavour to learn more about an important aspect of my area of undergraduate study,
international affairs. Environments at the mercy of global climate change will be an
increasingly important focus of diplomacy, news media, politics, and economics in the
21st century, and as someone who is aspiring to a career dealing with global affairs, it is
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crucial that I understand these phenomena. Second, it is possible that this research could
contribute to a niche area of study that has, up until now, not seen significant cross-case
studies that compare two distinct contexts. This work expands on past research into the
nature of cooperation, conflict, success, and failure in negotiations between two or more
different types of actors. Finally, this project represents the synthesis of my studies in
international security with my research in sustainability. It is an attempt to join together
these two cornerstones of my undergraduate career. Just as these experiences played such
a large role in my development as a student and young professional, so too does this work
encapsulate a months-long process that has allowed me to capitalize on four years of
growth and development.

6

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
To establish a framework for this project, I consult literature across a diverse
array of disciplines. Such breadth is necessary to understand regions of the world and
decision-making processes where social, environmental, economic, and governmental
interests converge. Here, I incorporate insights from these varied fields in my
examination of past scholarship. The first section is devoted to examining past research
on water resource security, a subfield of security studies that considers how actors behave
when control of water or access to it is the primary goal of cooperation or conflict.
Particularly important in this field of study is research on the nature of the relationship
between cooperation and conflict, a discussion which comes up again later on in my
“Results and Analysis” section. After this, I identify key aspects of past literature on roots
of conflict to support my discussion later on of success and elements of it in decisionmaking processes around shared water resources. I then identify specific themes related
to cooperation and conflict and important characteristics of the two cases I am concerned
with in this study: the Penobscot and Aral Sea contexts. This literature review ends with a
consideration of how past research treats issues of scale. In this project it is important to
attend to obvious differences between the two cases, particularly in regard to how we
should bridge the gap and make comparisons between two seemingly dissimilar
processes. Through integration of this literature, I attempt to support my subsequent
analysis of a set news articles about the Penobscot and Aral Sea.
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International water resource security
Water resource security is not a new area of study. During the latter half of the
20th century, research into this area of interdisciplinary study, particularly in relation to
its international component, increased exponentially. In the last few decades, the
discussion around resource security has evolved much as researchers’ conceptualizations
of what security means in an international context has shifted. The focus of analysis has
historically been on areas of conflict, but new scholarship recognizes the need for more
in-depth analysis of successful projects, regional collaborations, and water security
negotiations to develop proactive policies for governments (Vishwanath et al., 2015).
The study of water security arose from the overlap between various different
disciplines, including political science, economics, environmental studies, and security
studies. In this way, the manner in which water security studies grew reflects its highly
interdisciplinary nature. Within this subject, a key focus is on how states make decisions
over a finite amount of shared water resources, which are often economically, politically,
and socially significant (Morai and de Almeida, 2012). Olson (1965) and many others
theorized that in such situations, the group achieves a poor collective outcome when its
individual members pursue their personal best strategies. There must be give and take,
concession and compromise, for a successful negotiation process to take place.
While past scholarship has emphasized the conflictive nature of water security, it
also recognizes that few if any wars are fought over water in the modern era. Despite this
fact, water-related security incidents are not downplayed, and a plethora of theoretical

8

frameworks have been developed to predict water conflicts. The scale of water conflict
event intensity pioneered research to measure degrees of severity in water interactions
(Yoffe et al., 2001). Frey (2009) emphasized the power dynamics present in water
interactions to develop a method of analyzing international river systems and basins.
Building off these models, Zeitoun and Warner (2005), seeking to characterize the
dynamics of water conflict, theorize that control of water resources is not the incentive or
reward for war but the result of strategic policy and power tactics in a system of “hydrohegemony.” The distinction here is one of nuance; by integrating ideas of relative conflict
intensity with a framework for analyzing power in a system, we achieve the ability to
more accurately characterize complex interstate relationships over water. Based on past
research, this is an important insight. In any analysis, a balance must be achieved
between measuring the intensity of an interaction and theorizing how that interaction
came to be, what factors act as stressors, and how it can be resolved.
In addition to developing predictors of water interactions and scales for measuring
intensity, research around water security has peripherally attempted to answer the
question of why few wars were fought over water in the 20th century. Numerous theories
have been put forth. In the 1990s, Allan developed the theory of “virtual water” as a
reason why countries that lack hydro resources may not have devolved into conflict
(Allan, 1998). In this research, Allan (1997), using the example of the Middle East, also
predicted that to alleviate the pressures of physical water scarcity a country may lean
more heavily on food imports, essentially substituting the means to produce food for the
product itself. Allen’s assessment rests on the presumption that the demand for water is
based on 1) demographics and 2) agriculture and patterns on food consumption. Homer-
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Dixon (1999) agrees with this view and adds that humans have a propensity to adapt their
behavior and attitude when confronted with the issue of natural resource scarcity,
meaning that war is often a low-tier option and other solutions can be found first by
innovating and adapting. Still, Zeitoun and Warner (2005) argue that countries do not
wage water wars because of a tendency of states to comply with regulations and norms
established by dominant hegemons in individual systems, exemplified by interactions in
the Middle East (Feitelson, 2000). While various in their reasons, these explanations for
the absence of water wars on a global stage all indicate a common theme: War is not a
desirable outcome of water interactions. When conflict does erupt, it is usually at a local
level, not between states (GCI, 2000). When all parties share the resource, all parties are
able to affect the resource. This collective investment seems to be a factor that dissuades
states from raising arms over shared rivers and basins.
The result of the lack of water wars means that hydrosecurity research instead
focuses on conflict. But this has proven to be a problematic paradigm due to the tendency
to ignore instances of cooperation. As I will discuss later on, a major focus of research in
the 21st century in hydrosecurity has taken aim at understanding how all water events
involve elements of cooperation and conflict which often intertwine in complex ways
(Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008). A single event or series of events can incorporate
elements of cooperation and elements of conflict. In fact, while the predominant trend for
much of the 20th century was the look at hydro security through the lens of conflict,
research indicates that international relations over water resources are largely cooperative
in nature across a wide range of issues including water quantity, water quality,
management, and energy generation (Yoffe et al., 2001).
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An interesting nuance to this discussion is the ways in which water can be used as
a tool of nations. This notion has historically been constrained by research that focuses or
leans heavily on the conflictive aspects of shared water resources — when water is a tool
of war, usually as a result of scarcity. For example, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
took control of the Tabqa and Mosul dams in 2013 and 2014, respectively. Recent
scholarship, however, has taken a look at how water can be used as a tool of soft power, a
bargaining chip. Chellaney (2015) notes that such interactions can bring multiple parties
to the table and produce water treaties codifying agreed-upon rules for navigation,
economic use, infrastructure development, and territorial demarcation.
These represent some of the broad characteristics and foci of research of
interactions around shared water resources. It is important to identify trends in past
scholarship to establish a baseline for discussing this issue further in the context of the
Penobscot River and Aral Sea. Also important in this discussion is a fundamental
knowledge of how past scholarship conceptualizes the relationship between conflict and
collaboration, the two primary dimensions that many experts and professionals use to
judge the nature of international relations.

The relationship between conflict and collaboration
Hydrosecurity can be analyzed in multiple ways. It can be an economic, political
or military issues. In most analyses, a common way to frame hydrosecurity is how much
it involves conflict or cooperation, two terms which are helpful in gaining a sense of how
peaceful or threatening a decision-making process between multiple actors over a shared
resource can be. While the literature on shared water resources is replete with multiple
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approaches to understanding issues, cooperation and conflict are by far the dominant
lenses employed by academics. Investigating how these terms are deployed operationally
in academic literature is important for building a base knowledge of the importance of
language. Additionally, untangling the words conflict and cooperation is important in
understanding how actors interact in respect to their shared waters.
While often conceived of as diametrically opposed, conflict and cooperation —
the two forces which usually serve as dominant lenses of analysis for water security
situations — are not inherently separate concepts according to some authors. This is to
say that one situation of water security can and often does involve a mixture of conflict
and cooperation in one process, an idea which did not receive widespread attention in
academic literature in the 20th century. Now, the idea that there is more nuance to the
discussion of how actors behave in hydrosecurity situations is not only an increasingly
prevalent theme but one that can lend itself to correctly understanding the nature of these
events.
Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2008) argue that conflict and cooperation are in fact
inseparable, blurry terms. To conceive of interactions along these axes is reflective of
outdated paradigms in the study of water security and in practical application in policy
actually serves to perpetuate, or at least ignore, real issues. This “either/or” mindset leads
to problematic understandings that all cooperation is good and all conflict is bad. In
reality, “Token cooperation’… may serve to veil or perpetuate conflict. Coercive
cooperation can deepen conflict” (Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008).
An offshoot of the either/or mindset is the propensity to think of one process —
conflict or cooperation — as dominant over the other. In academic rhetoric, especially in
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the 20th century, conflict is often portrayed as a major potential outcome of any given
water resource decision making process. “The potential for acute interstate conflict in
international river basins arises because transboundary water resources, especially rivers
that transcend national borders, evoke to major concerns of the riparian states:
sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Elhance, 1996). Older literature on hydrosecurity
does not mention that the converging interests of sovereignty and territorial integrity also
open up the space for cooperation between states. This value is relegated to a secondary,
unmentioned position. On the other side, recent work attends to cooperation as an
important outcome, equal in weight to conflict (De Stefano et al., 2010). This conception
is representative of more recent modes of thinking on this subject.
If a prevailing issue of analysis is treatment of conflict and cooperation, then how
do we fix the issue? One method is by coming up with new models for analyzing decision
making processes around shared water resources. The Transboundary Water Interactions
Nexus (TWINS) is one such answer. According to Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2008),
“Transboundary water interaction may be understood, examined, analysed and explained
by considering positions on a two-dimensional matrix rather than at discrete locations on
a spectrum” (p. 307). In this system, the variables of conflict and cooperation are
considered together as part of the same process. The four predominant categories identify
differing degrees of positive and negative outcomes, with the most positive being a
process which involves low conflict and high cooperation and the most negative
involving medium-to-high conflict and low cooperation. All points in between are
accounted for. One can see how this approach seeks to do away with the traditional
either/or thinking exhibited in models like the modified Basins at Risk (BAR) project
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system of ranking cooperation and conflict two dimensionally (Yoffe et al., 2001). Under
BAR, the most intense conflicts are assigned a value of -7 and imply a “Formal
declaration of war”; a value of +7, on the other hand, means “Voluntary unification into
one state.” Some problems arise when assuming that the maximum degree of cooperation
means establishing a new unified state and the highest degree of conflict means war. To
think this way is to suggest that war is the most damaging form of conflict, for example,
and therefore downplay other security conflicts as less severe. In reality, more nuance is
needed in the discussion of the relationship between conflict and cooperation, and the
models one uses to analyze resource situations must address this fact.
There are multiple ways to think of conflict and cooperation. While past
scholarship emphasized the dichotomy of the two, it is increasingly common for
academics to recognize their inseparability. These concepts, according to recent
literature, are not as inherently opposed as they may seem; in fact, many argue that nearly
every instance of two actors interacting over shared water resources involved both
cooperation and conflict to some extent. Even if conflict and cooperation are inseparable,
however, it is important to be able to identify how the former arises. If we can determine
what gives rise to conflict then we can attempt to eliminate its roots.
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Roots of conflict
One of the most important areas of focus of research in international resource
security is trying to identify potentially difficult situations. This usually involved
developing a set of indicators and a system that can be used to rank different areas of the
globe in terms of their potential to devolve into conflict. The most important issues in
leading to water security conflict vary by methodology, area of analysis, and scale. These
issues can be considered as those whose history indicates they are the most prone to
generating a relatively high level of conflict when confronted. This relativity is key to
emphasize because, as will be seen later on, the degree of severity of water resource
security issues as measured by the BAR system, for example, is not as severe as it is for,
say, a threat of terrorism. However, this is not to say that these relatively non-violent
confrontations are necessarily less of a priority.
One category of researchers see roots of conflict or potential hot spots of water
resource interaction in aspects of the landscape or physical characteristics of a given
region. This determinist idea does not locate the causality of hot or cold interstate
relations solely in the features of a landscape but rather emphasizes that people making
decisions about their hydrological resources are, to a certain extent, confined in their
options by the nature of the those resources. Gleick (1993) was one of the first to
articulate this stance, addressing specifically the connection between conflict and shared
water resources and how, to a certain extent, environmental indicators in tandem with
other factors can predict severity of conflict.
The first box to be checked indicating a potential conflict between states is,
intuitively, that the states at hand have some sort of mutual interest in a single source of
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water (Ribiero and Sant'Anna, 2014). At a base level, this takes the form of two states’
abutting a river, reservoir, or large body of water. Within this relationship dynamic there
can exist different varieties with corresponding conntatable traits. In riparian
relationships, for example, both the upstream and downstream states claim sovereignty
over the water resource, often resulting in deadlock negotiation (Mirumachi and Allan,
2010). As will be seen later on, the nature of the Aral Sea basin represents a specific type
of hydro-resource relationship owing to its political and geographic features.
A potential blurring of event source occurs when the origin of conflict is
attributed to man-made objects, usually in the form of infrastructure, whose presence in
the environment is neither permanent nor temporary. Such objects and their effects can
produce further changes in the material nature of the environment, thereby becoming
themselves agents of change. A dam, for example, is not only the response to human
needs in a hydrological system; it is also the initiator of changes in sediment, flows,
migrations, and more. The Kara-Kum Canal, for example, is a source of contention
between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The former sees the canal as integral to “national
survival” and plans to lengthen it; on the other hand, Uzbekistan opposes expanding the
canal, which they see as an inefficient man-made river that contributes to the degradation
of the Aral Sea (Micklin, 2002). All this should be considered separate from interstate
relations, changes in which can rarely be traced back to one factor of the consensus or
disagreement over some aspect of the environment. In these relations, other elements
outside the realm of natural resources are at play.
On a macro level of analysis, one can also understand conflicts and cooperations
over shared water resources as issues of sovereignty. Non-land political boundaries are
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historically problematic, and conflict can arise over water when states attempt to
negotiate their claims of sovereignty and identity (Ribeiro, 2012). If a resource becomes
scarce, a country may perceived that as an infringement on its sovereignty and conflict
can arise (Ribeiro, 2014).
It is important to note that, like many theories of how water conflict and
cooperations come to rise, the idea that physical characteristics of a region or landscape
influence relations there accurately recognizes that other more immaterial processes are
at play. De Stefano et al. (2010) argue that infrastructure and water quantity in a given
area are the two most controversial issues between actors. They also name “joint
management, flood control and technical cooperation” as elements that often are involved
in “positive interactions” (De Stefano et al., 2010). Other researchers place even more
emphasis on the decision-making process over the physical properties of a case, arguing
that it is less the physical characteristics of a system and more the response of political
actors and policy makers that either leads to or prevents conflict. most of the parameters
regularly identified as indicators. Wolf et al. (2003) say: “[M]ost of the parameters
regularly identified as indicators of water conflict are actually only weakly linked to
disputes, but that institutional capacity within a basin, whether defined as water
management bodies or treaties, or generally positive international relations are as
important, if not more so, than the physical aspects of a system” (p. 29). The capacity to
adapt — and, additionally, how an actors chooses to respond — in this case is seen as
more determinant of if conflict will occur or not.
It is important to accept that all of these factors, to some extent, play a role in
leading to conflict. The sheer number of variables that researchers use and the relative
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inability to come to a consensus on which are the most inflammatory demonstrates that
there is really no one root cause of the issue at a macroscopic level of analysis. Only
when one zooms into the regional level can generalizations be made with some certain
accuracy. Now that I have identified some general trends in past scholarship in hydro
security, cooperation, and conflict, I look to establish the two cases in which I intend to
apply these insights.

The Aral Sea context
The Aral Sea is located between the states of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in
Central Asia. Due to Soviet water management policies, the Aral Sea shrunk to roughly
10 percent of its original size in the past half century, leaving only relatively small basins
of water in the west and northeast respectively of the plain where the sea once lay. The
eastern portions of the former Aral Sea are now referred to as the Aralkum Desert. What
was once the fourth-largest lake in the world is now divided into a few relatively small
bodies of water, but nonetheless security issues persist. The Aral Sea is still an integral
component of the national security strategy for many countries in Central Asia.
Since at least the 19th century, humans have theorized ways to harness the Aral
Sea’s massive resource potential. Writing in 1882, Russian geographer and climatologist
A.I. Voeikov wrote: “The existence of the Aral Sea within its present limits is evidence
of our backwardness and our inability to make use of such amounts of flowing water and
fertile silt, which the Amu and Syr rivers carry. In our country, which is able to use the
gifts of nature, the Aral Sea would serve to receive water in winter [when it is not needed
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for irrigation] and release it in summer during high flow” (Glantz, 1999, p. 157). From
the time of the U.S.S.R.’s formal establishment in 1922, the lands around the Aral Sea
were seen as optimal areas to invest in heavy irrigation, particularly cotton which was
exported throughout the Soviet republics. It was only during the 1960s that people started
to make substantial measurements of the basin and devote significant scholarship toward
its study. Coincidentally, this was also the time when the most intense Soviet irrigation
projects were undertaken in the country. Glantz (1999) notes that in 1959, when
construction of the first stage of the Karakum Canal began, the surface area of the body
was 66,000 km^2. In comparison, by 2014 all parts of the now largely disconnected lakes
had a total surface area of 6,990 km^2 (Micklin, 2016). Water management projects
continued and expanded through the rest of the century pursuant to the Soviet belief that,
as Glantz (1999) puts it, “the increment in the output of agriculture and animal husbandry
in the Aral Sea basin as a whole would be much higher, in terms of value, than the total
damage caused by the desiccation of the Aral Sea” (p. 166). Time proved this logic
wrong in the eyes of the Central Asian states.
The attitude that the outright depletion of the Aral Sea’s resources with little
concern for the desiccation of the body of water was permissibly began to change toward
the end of the 20th century. After independence, Kazakhstan began to attempt to restore
the northern Aral Sea in the 1990s, eventually leading to a World Bank-funded $85million dike construction project. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union began a program to
rehabilitate major wetlands, a process continued by Uzbekistan today. Still, as a result of
various countries’ policies, the Aral Sea continues to face obstacles to being restored to
even a fraction of its pre-1960s ecological state. Micklin and Aladin (2008) note that, at
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the time, four of five former Soviet republics in the Aral Sea basin intended to expand
irrigation, which accounts for 92 percent of water take away from the lakes.
After the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the Aral Sea region saw a great deal of
cooperation among its states. A basin that was once governed by one body was suddenly
divided in terms of interests among five states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan;
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Beginning with the creation of the Interstate Commission
on Water Coordination (ICWC), the states entered an unprecedented era of collaborative
management of shared waters. The ICWC oversees, among other things, states’ use of
water for agriculture, and its leadership is multinational. However, emblematic of Zeitoun
and Mirumachi’s (2008) idea that conflict and cooperation intersect in instances of
international water events, the ICWC has seen internal disputes arising from the
allocation of water to states (Micklin, 2002). This organization is one example of the
kinds of actors that are involved in modern-day hydrosecurity negotiations around the
Aral Sea. Others include the state governments themselves and international institutions,
like the World Bank. This organization specifically has become one of the most active
entities in international security relations in the region. The World Bank’s involvement in
the Aral Sea region highlights another important force: the role of economic interests.
Musabekov et al. (2018) emphasize that for reasons of economic exploitation and
national interests, many other nations outside the immediate region are concerned with its
policy, such as Russia and China, countries who trade with those in the region. The
economic factor again includes elements of conflict and collaboration, and its
consequences are also felt in other sectors of society. Through analysis of the economic
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interactions of the region, one sees another example of how these countries interact in
complex reactionary and proactive ways regarding their shared natural resources.
While only a few nations touch the Aral Sea, many countries of Central Asia have
a say in how it is managed and what policy toward the body of water should look like.
The international security situation of the region is highly complex, involving a high
degree of simultaneous cooperation and conflict in its various decision-making processes.
These nations have to some extent viewed the ecological degradation of the past and
attempted to collaborate to create a more sustainable future. But still the economic,
agricultural, and national needs of some countries have outweighed the desire to
collaborate or pursue a collective good based on principles of sustainability. Dynamics
within the region, then, are complex and multi-faceted, requiring a deeper level of
analysis to fully understand and characterize. How these relations fit into the wider global
phenomenon of hydrosecurity relations is also an important insight to pursue through
case study methodology.
The Aral Sea represents a very interesting region of the globe where the classic
story of environmental issues mixing with political and economic plays out in an extreme
degree. Many would argue that the degradation of the Aral Sea was one of the greatest
human-caused environmental tragedies of the 20th century, and today nations of the
region must deal with the fallout of decisions made in the past. It is important to
recognize how distinct this context is when moving to the next case, the Penobscot River,
which many believe to be one of the best examples of successful cooperation around a
river system.
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The Penobscot Context
The Penobscot River runs 109 miles from the interior of Maine to the state’s
rocky coastline, eventually meeting the sea in Penobscot Bay. A feature of the landscape
of great cultural importance, the river has been and remains an integral part of the identity
of the indigenous Penobscot Nation whose members currently reside on an island in the
river near Old Town, Maine. Development of the river picked up in the 1800s with the
rise of the logging industry in Maine as people began to float logs down from the forests
of the center of the state to lumber mills downstream. It was also during this time that
companies began to dam the river, something that the Penobscot Nation historically
opposed. Use of the river in the 20th century shifted more toward paper production with
the construction of many paper mills, and hydropower generation continued. Finally, in
the early 21st century, the Penobscot River Restoration Project (PRRP) began. The
PRRP, which officially ran from 1999 to 2016, was the joint venture of the Penobscot
Trust — a coordinating non-profit group designed to organize efforts around the project
— the Penobscot Nation, a hydropower company, state and federal agencies, and
conservation groups. The project resulted in the removal of two dams on the river,
improvements to others, and changes in hydropower generation.
Recent scholarship about the Penobscot River, and in particular the PRRP,
emphasizes the abundance of contending interests around the river and how those
interests were accounted for in decision-making processes. Roy et al. (2018) discuss the
“balancing of trade offs” between river restoration, hydropower production, and cost. In
the context of the PRRP, the authors emphasize that what people generally conceived of
as opposed tradeoffs were able to be successfully negotiated by the various actors of the
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project. The PRRP resulted in an increase in sea-run fish populations while maintaining a
similar level of hydropower generation that existed before the Penobscot Trust bought
and removed dams on the river. Other research on dam removal projects in a general
sense highlights the complexities inherent in removal of these infrastructure works due
to, again, the need for stakeholders to make decisions between economic, environmental,
and social tradeoffs (Baish et al., 2002).
Of these, one of the greatest interests at play during the PRRP was the cultural
relevance of the river to the Penobscot Nation. Ever since it was first dammed in the
1800s, the river has been the subject a battle between the Penobscot Nation and various
governmental agencies and energy companies. The disagreement over the development
and status of the river highlights traditional issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity
that arise between actors when they share natural resources (Elhance, 1996). This
disassociation of the river from its traditional custodians highlights issues of colonial
heritage that have resulted in other issues of sovereignty and legitimacy, such as the
Penobscot Nation’s lack of ownership of many of its traditional objects of material
culture (Anderson, 2018). These issues demonstrate the vast amount of contending
interests at play in interactions over water resources which are not only limited to
economic and environmental factors.
In news media and public discourse, the PRRP is often described as a successful
project. This has been reflected in research in multiple dimensions. First, the project
resulted in an increased habitat accessibility for fish in the Penobscot River (Stich, 2014).
Many citizens around the state of Maine have called the effort a fish-oriented project for
this very reason, and restoring this habitat was one of the original goals of the project.
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Next, the ability of the PRRP to bring multiple actors is often cited as one of the reasons
it was so successful, with the respect and accessibility to the project of all stakeholders
being a factor that led to favorable outcomes for all. Particularly, it was the project’s
deference to the Penobscot Nation, a group which had historically been at odds with the
hydropower companies who own dams on the Penobscot River, that made it such an
unprecedented collaboration (Frederick, 2006). Both of the above examples demonstrate
how the PRRP’s accomplishments were multidimensional and are perceived as successful
not only in what the project achieved but in how it achieved those things too.
Research on the Penobscot River can help us understand it in multiple ways. In
particular, the major threads of scholarship related to either the PRRP or the river itself
focus on what led to the perceived success of the project, including the ability of the
project to engage stakeholders in unprecedented ways, the balancing of tradeoffs, and the
restoration of habitat for wildlife. The literature also emphasized the cultural significance
of the river to the Penobscot Nation which highlights issues of sovereignty and territorial
integrity that exist in similar instances of interactions between different actors regarding
water resources. This same topic plays an important role in comparisons between the
Penobscot River and Aral Sea, a necessary component of this project for which the next
section, which addresses scale, is also helpful.

Issues of scale
In comparing the Aral Sea and Penobscot River it is essential to consider how past
research can teach us how to address differences of scale. The two cases are inherently
different even from a bird’s eye view, with one concerning actors across thousands of
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miles of Central Asia and the other concerning actors within the state of Maine in the
United States. Upon a first glance, there appears to be little reason for comparing the
PRRP, a process that while involving multiple constituent actors was contained within
the state of Maine, and similar decision-making processes regarding the Aral Sea, which
are overwhelmingly transnational in nature. But research tells us that cross-scale
comparisons can enrich insights in social sciences (Vervoort, 2012). There are clear
differences between these cases in numerous ways, and past research on issues of scale in
the multiple dimensions I analyse in the context of these cases can help navigate them.
First, it is necessary to define the main term we are working with: scale. Gibson et
al.’s (2000) definition is the most commonly used and defines scale as “The spatial,
temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimensions used to measure and study any
phenomenon.” This project adopts the developed idea that these “dimensions” should be
a dominant vector of analysis (Vervoort et al., 2012). Approaching scale this way
emphasizes the commonalities between the two cases at hand without miring the analysis
in consideration of the differences of geography and type of decision-making entity. The
dimensions of these cases are what draw a thread between them, and for that they take
front seat.
For this study whose approach is complex and rather unorthodox, more nuance is
needed in the discussion of scale. In broad terms, dynamic regions involving a confluence
of social, economic, ecological, governmental, and legal actors require a relative scale of
analysis. In contrast to absolute scale, which takes a literal approach to geography
(meaning that analysis of the PRRP would be confined to the boundaries of the river
banks), relative scale considers space a fluid, dynamic concept which may mean different
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things to different people (Gibson et al, 2000). Past scholarship indicates that a flexible
use of scale allows for the opportunity to bridge gaps between disciplinary approaches
(Vervoort et al., 2012). Applying this same relative scale of analysis to both regions
allows for greater flexibility in cross-examining results.
Geography is only one differing feature of these two cases. Involved in each
scenario is a vast and diverse cast of actors of varying sizes, from the Penobscot Nation
of Maine to the state of Uzbekistan. How these conglomerate entities entities make
decisions is again a question of scale. From the household to the international level,
different entities’ decision making is confined by the scale at which it operates (Gibson et
al, 2000). Later on, this issue of scale will come into play as I compare the ramifications
of decisions made in the Penobscot and Aral Sea contexts.
In the context of this study, one of the most important considerations related to
scale is how phenomena and processes at different scales should be cross-analyzed. What
sorts of considerations need to be made? What are the implications of such analyses?
This project set out with a sense that attempting to answer these questions would provide
additional insights into the nature of decision making around hydro resources. Much of
the literature that addresses phenomena at different scales looks at how scales intersect in
one situation. How, for example, do trade, climate change, and governance operate
simultaneously on multiple scales? (Verburg et al., 2013). Researchers like Cash et al.
(2006) delve into the theoretical and recognize that interactions can occur across or
within different scales and note that such cases are highly complex. Researchers also
recognize that transboundary water issues operate across many scales, from the
household to international. Changes in national water policy, international conflict, and
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cooperation can affect individuals, making them less or more vulnerable to threats to their
livelihoods, or directly threatening those livelihoods themselves (Warner and Johnson,
2007). So far, few cross-analyses have been conducted on cases of different scales, but
some of the same trends can be seen across similar situations operating on different
scales, indicating that it is possible to co-analyze the two.
While research into the comparability of such cases as I am dealing with here is
lacking, there is a broad range of literature addressing issues of scale in decision making
between different actors, natural resources, and geography. These issues are important
ones in the contexts of the Aral Sea and Penobscot River, two cases which are different in
so many ways. In this section I reviewed literature that focused on the definition of scale,
two primary types of scales, what constitutes a difference of scale, and how scales
intersect. Later on, I will use these insights on scale to set the foundation for establishing
connections between the two cases under the scope of this project.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODS

With the understanding that qualitative analysis can yield incredibly rich results,
particularly in interdisciplinary studies, I set out to use common tools of case-study
analysis in this project. Previous research on the Future of Dams Project taught me the
value of coding as a method of analyzing something when you are not certain of the
answer you are looking for. I was certain that I was interested in investigating the nature
of cooperation and successful outcomes around international relations concerning water
resources, but I did not have specific testable hypotheses. This coding methodology
provided the opportunity to glean insights that I would not have been able to account for
beforehand. It also allowed me to focus in on aspects of negotiations between actors that,
I believed, could yield the most significant understandings. This process did provide
significant results in a way that other methodologies may not have. Thus I used an
overarching case study methodology (Yin, 2014), document analysis, and qualitative
coding for my primary methods (Creswell, 2014; Seidman, 2006).
The methods used in this study were based on my previous work in qualitative
research. I had previously helped conduct a media discourse analysis of newspaper
articles related to the Penobscot River. Some products of that research carried over into
this project. The database of articles I used for the Penobscot River, for example, was
originally developed for use in a media discourse analysis about dam removal as one subsection of this overarching investigation into decision making around dams. My previous
research experience also informed this research in other intangible ways. A process of
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inter-coder reliability that I conducted as a part of the project helped me refine my coding
skills as well as learn how to develop codes so that they support my research questions.
Similarly, having done previous work in iterative coding, I was aware of what kinds of
themes could emerge from having a dynamic codebook and general set of questions, not
hypotheses. Therefore, I developed my codebook based on the terms that I believed
would point me toward emergent themes which I only had a vague or abstract sense of
coming into the project, such as how collaboration and reconciliation of tradeoffs can
lead to success. Through my previous work, I was also made aware of how to structure a
database of newspaper articles, something which helped tremendously when I attempted
to emulate for the Aral Sea context portions of the corpus of Penobscot articles I
transferred from the previous project.
Constructing these parallel databases was the first step in this process. These
articles as a collective represent the major artifact of study at hand. The database used for
this project was Nexis Uni, a compilation of over 15,000 journal articles, news artifacts,
legal documents, and business sources developed by LexisNexis. For this project, two
databases of articles needed to be gathered: one related to the Penobscot River context,
and one related to the Aral Sea context.
The Penobscot River articles were gathered first as a component of the Future of
Dams project over a year ago in preparation for a media discourse analysis about dam
removal. For this previous study, researchers searched for news articles on Nexis Uni
(then called LexisNexis) using the terms “dam removal” and “removal the dam.”
Database searches were constrained to between April 1986 and July 2016 — a timeframe
which was roughly reflective of the official lifespan of the PRRP. From this search

29

process a total of 1,480 articles related to dams and dam removal were yielded. These
results were then ranked in relevance to the PRRP based on the appearance of 10 phrases:
“penobscot river,” restoration project,” penobscot restoration,” “penobscot river
restoration project,” “restoration trust,” “penobscot river restoration trust,” “penobscot
nation,” and “penobscot indian nation.” This ranking was indiscriminate, meaning no
search term was ranked more highly than any other, and exclusionary because it did not
include many other phrases that could have been related to the Penobscot River. From
this, the top 78 results were taken, this being a reflection of the number of articles
gathered in the search for Aral Sea-related articles, the rationale for which I will discuss a
bit later on. I chose to analyze only the top 78 articles related to the Penobscot in order to
help create parallel conditions in each dataset, meaning that both sets of articles were
from the same period of time, were similar in sample size, and included similar subject
materials (namely cooperation or conflict over water resources).
At this point, it should be noted that the time constraints I used in this project
deserve flagging as something to consider going into the analysis. I stopped collecting
articles at the end of 2016, but since that time there have been many developments in the
Penobscot context. The river is still undergoing changes based on that project, some of
which are unexpected. I will explore this potential limitation in more depth later on in the
paper, but for now it is simply important to emphasize that these articles end at 2016 and
therefore may not reflect current trends in public discourse and scientific research around
the Penobscot’s restoration.
For the second component of the cross-case study, I used similar methods of
collecting articles. Previous general searches for news articles about international
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relations around the Aral Sea yielded an immense amount of articles, and since I was
interested primarily in discussions of cooperation, negotiations, and success, I decided to
narrow my search with three terms: “Aral Sea,” “Conflict,” and “Cooperation,” from
articles published between Jan. 1, 1996 and Jan. 1, 2017 (roughly congruent with the end
date for the gathering of Penobscot River articles). This search yielded 78 results in the
form of news articles and web-based publications. Even though the majority of them
came from newspapers abroad, these articles all appeared in Nexis Uni searches in
English. I did no independent translation.
The next step in the process was to code the articles, and for that I needed to
develop a rudimentary codebook which I built based on the literature review and
theoretical framework described above. Nine of the same codes were applied to each set
of 78 articles: “Challenges,” “Cooperation,” “Conflict,” “Codified agreements,”
“Failure,” “Leadership,” “Contingency,” “Infrastructure,” “Management,” and “Success.”
I developed these codes based on insights into the coding process I learned from my
previous work in qualitative research. For example, something like “leadership,” I found,
could help one get a sense of power dynamics in a decision-making process. From this
previous process, I also saw two primary sources of justifying codes: literature and
newspaper articles. The first prescribes theoretical justifications for what themes one
might see emerge in coding by discussing major issues in a given field. Examples of this
can be found in Table 1. The second method substantiates a code’s validity with themes
directly seen in newspaper articles; inherently, this type of code is somewhat iterative in
nature. In my study, I used these same systems of justification, meaning each code was
established based on insights from literature or themes I saw emerge from the articles. I
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then applied these codes based on dominant themes that I saw in a paragraph, indirect,
and direct references to the codes or their definitions. These are expressed in Table 1
below. “Management,” for example, was developed as a code based on previous research
into how different styles of management lead to different outcomes in decision-making
processes concerning water security (Baaker, 2012). The interaction of these codes with
each other, their prevalence in the articles, and what sorts of themes emerged broadly
across the two cases were major focuses of the coding process.
Inter-coder reliability is an important component of qualitative studies like this.
Because I was working independently, my capacity to verify my methods and findings
against those of a collaborator were constrained. I had to make do with the context of my
project, knowing, generally, the kinds of themes one needs to look for in ascertaining
reliability, based on my previous work in discourse analysis and coding of news articles.
The primary was that I did this was by periodically checking my findings from coding
with my advisor, Professor Bridie McGreavy, who would give me feedback on my
interpretations. During bi-weekly meetings, we would discuss my underlying rationale
for including a code in this study, how the code was applied, and what I was learning in
the application of that code. My findings were supported through this format. I received
regular confirmation that the themes I was seeing emerge from my databases of articles
were consistent with what I expected to find based on initial research questions, past
scholarship, my studies of Eurasian affairs, and my past engagement with members of the
Penobscot Nation and stakeholders in the PRRP. For example, the coexisting nature of
conflict and cooperation in one decision-making process was a major touchstone of
literature I examined for this project. I observed this theme emerge in both Aral Sea and
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Penobscot articles as I began to read and code them, and when I checked with my advisor
I was given confirmation that pursuing this thread more deeply would be valuable. For
these reasons, while my coding did not undergo the rigorous process of inter-coder
reliability that might be necessary in similar projects, it nonetheless had mechanisms to
verify the validity of methods.

Table 1. Definitions and justifications for codes.
Code

Definition

Justification

Challenges

Events, objects, entities that are framed as
inhibitors or obstacles to overcome in a
decision-making process.

Included because of references
to future and past challenges
in both sets of articles.

Cooperation

Where one or more actors come together to
make a collective decision or engage in a
collective process where everyone is able to
pursue, to varying degrees, their individual
goals.

An integral aspect of decision
making that appears in nearly
every article about decision
making around natural
resources.

Conflict

Where one or more actors disagree or engage
in violence as part of a decision-making
process.

Gleick, Peter H. Water and
Conflict: Fresh Water
Resources and International
Security. International
Security, 1993.

Codified
agreements

Examples of or references to written
agreements, such as formal treaties or
business contracts.

Included due to the presence
of such agreements in Aral
Sea and Penobscot articles.

Failure

Elements or examples of a process that has
failed to result in a solution that all or many
groups find adequate.

An integral aspect of decision
making that appears in nearly
every article about decision
making around natural
resources.

Success

Elements or examples of a process whose
result is framed as being mutually favorable
to all or many constituent actors.

An integral aspect of decision
making that appears in nearly
every article about decision
making around natural
resources.
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Leadership

Examples of people or entities who are
framed as in charge of or guiding something.

Included due to descriptions of
leadership in decision-making
processes in Penobscot
articles.

Contingency

Uncertainty regarding outcomes of a process
or events in the future.

Included due to presence of
uncertainty in Penobscot
articles

Infrastructure Where examples of existing, past, or planned
infrastructure are mentioned.

Articles about the Penobscot
River emphasize the presence
of infrastructure as a major
factor in decision making.

Management

Baaker, Karen. Water
Security: Research Challenges
and Opportunities. Science,
2012.

People, groups, organizations, states, or
agencies who are said to be or depicted as
being in charge of the administration or
control of water resources.

When coding commenced, there were a few decisions that needed to be made
about how the process would look. Due to the number of articles at hand, I decided to
apply overlapping codes at the paragraph level. In practice, this meant that if one
paragraph, for example, contained references to management, conflict, collaboration, and
challenges, the relevant codes would all be applied to the whole paragraph. Paragraphs
were not coded for what themes emerged as the dominant angle or purpose of the
selected text. Instead, the strategy I used allowed for both the text relevant to the code
and contextual information contained in the surrounding text of the paragraph to be
captured. As I will discuss below, this process yielded more contextually rich insights for
many themes that emerged in this work. It is worth mentioning that both sets of articles
— those related to the Penobscot River and those related to the Aral Sea — were coded
with the same exact standards and the same set of codes.
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Another consideration in the coding process was what is worthy of being coded.
The definitions provided in the figure above helped guide the coding process and
established rough criteria of sorts for what needed to be coded. By using these relatively
strict definitions — which were developed at the outset and refined through the process
based on the needs of the study — I was able to make judgements on what paragraphs
should be coded. The results, therefore, reflect specific insights and questions that were
based in literature and developed dynamically as a component of this coding process.
The methods used by this study proved to be effective in revealing insights into
the nature of cooperation, international relations, and international security related to
shared water resources. Coding was an effective strategy to identify themes that both the
Aral Sea and Penobscot River contexts share. These themes will be discussed later on in
this paper, but first, in the next section, I explain the results that this coding process
produced.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Introduction
With this study I set out to investigate a few things. First, I wanted to know more,
generally, about the nature of collaboration and conflict in the area of international water
resource security. As global climate change threatens to exacerbate problems in areas
where water is already hotly contested, it is crucial to know what practices and trends
lend themselves to producing successful outcomes for decision-making processes. By the
same token, we must be aware of the nature of situations that are largely mired in
conflict; for to know the nature of these interactions is to understand and subsequently
root out those early indicators that a situation could turn violent or, at the very least,
disagreeable. This section of the study seeks to build on prior scholarship in an attempt to
glean more insight into potential answers to these questions. This section is divided into
four parts, with each of the last three linking a research question to results obtained from
the coding process and interpreting those results. The first section provides a general
overview of the quantitative results I obtained from coding to demonstrate how the codes
were applied in action and what kinds of data I obtained from the process. Next, I move
on to discuss some general trends interactions over shared water resources in Penobscot
and Aral Sea contexts, placing an emphasis on the potential for these to be representative
of greater trends. My next section investigates the nature of success and goals in decision
making within these two contexts to prepare for the final component of this chapter in
which I attempt to identify key aspects of these positive outcomes. While also
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considering lessons from past literature, I argue that insights from these two cases can
shed more light on the individual idiosyncrasies of every decision-making process over
shared water resources but also point toward broader themes.

Quantitative analysis
Numerous themes emerge from the coding that give insight into the nature of
cooperation around shared water resources in wildly differing contexts in the Penobscot
and Aral Sea in ways that helped me address my main research questions which were
focused on [insert restatement of your research questions here]. To recap, the codes used
to structure the database were: “Challenges,” “Cooperation,” “Conflict,” “Codified
agreements,” “Failure,” “Leadership,” “Contingency,” “Infrastructure,” “Management,”
and “Success.” The following sections investigate both the quantitative and, to a greater
extent, qualitative results I obtained from coding using these terms.
Coding of the Aral Sea articles yielded results represented in the figure below.
Codes with a relatively high level of application (above 60 instances of appearance) were
cooperation (86 instances) and challenges (66 instances). Codes with a moderate level of
application (between 35 and 60) were failure (47 instances), contingency (44 instances),
conflict (39 instances), success (39 instances), codified agreements (37 instances), and
infrastructure (35 instances). The only codes that fell into the category of low level of
application were leadership at 33 instances and management at 16 appearances.
Due to the high degree of variation between the results obtained from the Aral Sea
and Penobscot articles, different scales of interpretation must be used. We must also
consider proportionality and the relativity of results. On the whole, there were more
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applications of codes overall on the 78 articles related to the Penobscot River. This means
that a distinct range should be used to categorize the codes’ level of applicability. Based
on the results, I propose using the following scale to rank the prevalence of codes: a high
level of application is applied to codes that appear at least 180 times; a moderate level of
application is between 180 and 45; and codes with a low level of application appear
fewer than 45 times.
Using this rationale, we can determine the following. For the Penobscot River
coding process, the codes that had a high level of applicability were infrastructure (367
instances), success (249 instances), cooperation (182 instances), and contingency (180
instances). Codes that had a moderate level of demonstrable applicability were leadership
(128 instances) and challenges (67 instances). The codes with the lowest level of
applicability were failure (49 instances), management (48 instances), codified agreements
(41 instances), and conflict (38 instances).

Figure 1. Frequency of applied codes.
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It is also a useful to compare the number of sources in which each code appeared.
Knowing such information allows for one to understand how news articles in general
conceive of an issue as important or worth mentioning (Pope et al., 2006). The previous
numbers indicating how many times a code appeared, while valuable, can be distorted by
some articles that are longer — like long-form features — and feature more instances of
the same code. Examining how many articles each code appeared in can paint a holistic
picture of how certain themes manifest in decision-making processes.
In regard to the Aral Sea, the codes that I found to appear across the most articles
were largely reflective of the same codes’ overall frequency of application. The codes
with the most appearances across articles were cooperation (40 articles), challenges (39
articles), failure (29 articles), and contingency (27 articles). Following those were
codified agreements (26 articles), success (26 articles), leadership (24 articles), conflict
(22 articles), infrastructure (18 articles) and management (10 articles). There are a few
special cases to note, particularly where the number of times a code was applied and the
number of articles in which a code appeared did not line up. Conflict, the fifth-mostapplied code, was seventh in number of articles in which the code appeared. Success, also
tied for the fifth-most-applied code, appeared in four more articles than conflict. The
code with the fewest instances of application at 18, management, was also the code that
appeared in the fewest articles (10 articles).
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Figure 2. How many articles each code appeared in.

The Penobscot River articles also reflected the same general trend as the Aral Sea
articles, with the most frequently applied codes also being the codes that appeared in the
most articles. The codes that appeared in the most articles were infrastructure (60
articles), success (58 articles), cooperation (53 articles), leadership (48 articles), and
contingency (47 articles). Following those were challenges (38 articles), failure (27
articles), management (24 articles), codified agreements (24 articles), and conflict (18
articles). Within this selection of coded articles there were some areas that produced
interesting results related to the congruence between number of times a code was applied
and number of articles in which a code appeared. Particularly noteworthy is
“contingency,” which, while applied 180 times, the fourth highest amount, was only
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found in 47 sources, the fifth highest amount. The number of articles in which the rest of
the codes appeared closely reflects their position in the ranking of which codes were
applied the most number of times.
In addition to being a helpful tool to grasp the results of the coding process, these
quantitative results can also support qualitative insights. Knowing how often a code was
applied can tell us something about dominant themes in news discourse (Pope et al.,
2006). As such, In the following sections I draw from and use some of these results to
substantiate claims about the nature of cooperation in the Penobscot and Aral Sea
contexts.
How do international cooperation’s focus on water security work?
The first major goal of this research was to establish a baseline understanding of
one niche area of international affairs. We can think of this process as a sort of
telescoping in on one issue from the macro-global view of international affairs. From the
general study of global processes and their major participants — international affairs —
we downsize to considering international security, the study of how states and other
actors seek to assure their prosperity and survival in dynamic systems. Within this
discipline there are many sub-categories relating to different aspects of security. In this
study, I focus on natural resource security, and, at another level deeper, security issues
related to hydro-resources (rivers, lakes, seas, and basins). Through this work, I was able
to realize some key features of the nature of cooperations in this area of international
affairs.
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The Nature of Conflict and Collaboration
First, one must understand the nature of the relationship between cooperation and
its often-employed antonym, “conflict.” The results from coding substantiate scholarship
in the realm of water security that there are different degrees of conflict and cooperation
(Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008). In the cases at hand, one may see that interactions
around Aral Sea and the Penobscot River both involve conflict and cooperation to
differing extents. Looking at the Penobscot, for example, one sees an emphasis on the
cooperative aspects of the PRRP. It is described by one article as “[A] model for river
restoration efforts around the world because it was made possible by cooperative
agreement among environmental groups, federal agencies, an Indian tribe and a power
company” (article a01083). Through the coding process it became apparent, too, that,
while not to the degree of the Penobscot, negotiations around the Aral Sea are indeed
highly cooperative. People there are aspiring to find optimal solutions for collective
problems. At the same time, “conflict” in the Aral Sea context appears to be a looming
threat, more so than in the Penobscot, with much coded text describing the “potential” for
conflict in the region (Central Asia has unrealized potential). Some articles even
attributed the desertification of the Aral Sea to the failure of nations to “cooperate”
(Creating a region of conflict). With the knowledge that the Aral Sea region contains
some potential indicators of conflict — namely sovereignty issues between upstream and
downstream nations and many riparian states — it is indeed possible that conflict remains
a constant source of
It is important to note that while the coding reflects a similar number of
occurrences of text relating to “cooperation” in each database, the word has different
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underpinnings in both. In the Penobscot articles, “cooperation” is often described as
something having been achieved and therefore contributing to successful negotiations.
For example, one articles states that “[the PRRP] has proven that business, government
and interested citizens can reach mutually agreeable solutions that benefit the community,
the economy and the environment” (a00814). On the other hand, in the Aral Sea articles,
“cooperation” is often an ideal, something identified as a necessary condition for success
but one that has not yet been realized to its full potential. In this regard, we see many
instances of language that is similar to the following:

“There must be a clear understanding that many environmental problems
in the region can only be solved through the cooperation of all five states”
(Central Asia needs unified strategy on water).

“Cooperation of our countries, as the leading states in Central Asia, has a
significant importance for the whole region. We are equally interested in
further strengthening and steady development of bilateral interactions”
(Cooperation, based on good neighbourhood and historical friendship,
develops steadily).

The ramifications of this distinction between the two datasets are significant. They tells
us that actors recognize the importance of collaborating with others as a prerequisite for a
successful project. They also substantiate the claim that collaborations around the Aral
Sea and Penobscot River are fundamentally different in multiple ways, not least of which
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is the level to which collaboration has succeeded or been implemented in each context
(Glantz, 1999; Roy, 2018).

Methods and Mediums of Cooperation
Branching off the idea of implementation, it is important to understand the ways
in which actors cooperate in these two cases. Articles related to the Aral Sea demonstrate
a different sort of decision-making process than in the Penobscot. In this first case, much
of the cooperation of the region is achieved through bilateral and multilateral treaties,
forums and economic initiatives — all of which are referenced in the coding. On the
other hand, the Penobscot, and by extension the PRRP, represents a very particular sort of
collaboration where multiple parties were brought to the table under the leadership of the
Penobscot Trust. In this process, everyone was afforded an equal amount of deference
and legitimacy in the decision-making process, something that a representative of the
Penobscot Nation. I will discuss this later on as an element contributing to a successful
outcome, but for now we must note merely the distinction in types of collaboration of the
two cases.
An area of overlap occurs with the building, deconstruction, change of
management, and other alterations of infrastructure, which was the major effort of the
PRRP and a solution sometimes used by Aral Sea actors. One sees a great divergence in
the frequency of codes related to infrastructure, with nearly every article in the Penobscot
context touching on dams in some way and only a few in the Aral Sea context doing the
same. Despite this, infrastructure — particularly dams — are treated nearly the same.
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These constructions are framed as sources of tensions between states, a notion
substantiated by past scholarship that says infrastructure is one of the two most
controversial issues between actors who share water resources (De Stefano et al., 2010).
In the Aral Sea context, nations constantly engage in dialogue around problematic dams
on the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, which both flow into the Aral Sea, because they
impact countries differently. The following quotes from articles in the Aral Sea database
highlight policy differences which, in turn, lead to issues over infrastructure construction:

“Downstream countries are strongly dependent on irrigated agriculture
while upstream countries are more focused on expanding reservoir
capacity and hydroelectric power generation” (Water management —
greatest challenge for Central Asian nations).

“Kyrgyzstan’ and Tajikistan’s plans for building a hydroelectric power
plant have been strongly criticized by Uzbekistan and has significantly
cooled relations between Uzbekistan and these two countries” (SCO
leaders support Russian initiative for Syria).

In considering the PPRRP, we see that even though the actors are different — this time
representing the interests of an energy company, government regulators, and indigenous
nation — the nature of dialogue around these dams is the same. The articles indicate that
people implicitly voice similar grievances over infrastructure, namely that dams serve the
interests of one group (power companies) and not another (the Penobscot Nation).
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“People who had been fighting each other for many decades set that aside
to focus on the common good, said Laura Rose Day, executive director of
the Penobscot River Restoration Trust” (a00983).

As the source of issues, infrastructure projects can provide an opportunity for nations to
collaborate and discover common solutions. This manifested with the PRRP in one case
and, in another, numerous forums, treaties, and discussions.

The relationship between conflict and collaboration

Another important feature of these interactions to note is the degree to which
cooperation and conflict are intertwined in decision-making processes about shared
natural resources. Past literature recognizes that, despite common conceptualizations,
conflict and collaboration are not diametrically opposed terms (Zeitoun and Mirumachi,
2008). We see examples of both conflict and collaboration existing simultaneously in
both the Aral Sea and Penobscot cases. In 1992, for example, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement to “manage and protect
water resources”:

“They tried to solve the environmental problems and foster social and
economic growth across the region by establishing the Interstate
Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia and the International

46

Fund for Saving the Aral Sea. However, finding middle ground was not
easy due to conflicting interests among the countries located upstream
along the rivers and downstream toward the sea itself” (article
Environmentalists head to rescue of marshes).

This is a theme persistent throughout the articles of the database. We see numerous other
cases of conflict existing within a framework of cooperation, or some other permutation
of the symbiotic relationship between the two. The Penobscot context exhibits this trend
as well. In one area that could have been affected by potential dam removal, “Area
residents who spoke said they were opposed to the plan, which they fear will allow free
range of invasive species such a pike (a00683). What is interesting to note is that this
dissent occurred at a public hearing within a project that purposefully sought to be
transparent with affected citizens. In the PRRP, Mainers were consulted and listened to
— maybe not given the same decision-making authority as other actors, but certainly not
excluded as collaborators.
Why is it important that we recognize the coexistence of cooperation and conflict?
Past literature emphasizes that this is not such an intuitive concept for many who craft
policy and report on current events, and indeed it used to be uncommon for scholarship
on hydrosecurity to characterize interactions this way (Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008).
Indeed, the words themselves seem to conjure up characterizations that are mutually
exclusive. In reality, manifestations of both collaboration and conflict can exist
simultaneously in one decision-making process, and these in turn can exist in different
degrees of severity. With this knowledge, measuring with certainty the overall nature of a
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process — whether it is collaborative or conflictive — becomes an ever more complex
endeavor, and attempting to accomplish such a task can actually serve to obfuscate the
reality of many situations, which cannot be boiled down into one of two simple black and
white categories. We must understand that the relationship between conflict and
collaboration — when we confront it in the context of decision making over shared
natural resources — is inherently more complex than our avenues of understanding
international affairs usually suggest.
The above do not represent an exhaustive or intensive examination of the
characteristics of cooperations around shared natural resources. Instead, what these cases
present us with are two valuable and distinct examples of how collaborations worked for
the Aral Sea and Penobscot River in a constrained time frame. Based on this assessment,
one can begin to postulate the existence of some overarching trends for processes,
negotiations, and events of a similar type. Such trends may include: the extent to which
“cooperation” in practice does not mean the same thing across different contexts; the
varied ways in which different groups of actors cooperate; the effects that infrastructure
has on a decision-making process and, conversely, the effects a decision-making process
has on infrastructure; and the tendency to view conflict and cooperation as polar
characteristics. In the next section I build from these insights slightly in an attempt to
establish a baseline working definition of “success” in natural resource decision making.
Understanding different parties’ goals can help us make sense of these trends and
consider why they occur.
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What, in the context of international cooperations focused on water security, does peace
mean?
Establishing an operational definition of “success” is an integral part of this
research and something that the coding has provided insight on. When we talk about
success in the case of collective decision making around natural resources, it often brings
a complex set of dilemmas to the table. Different actors have different interests; the goals
of state A may be distinct from those of state B. Furthermore, there are different levels of
responsibility and capacity in any collective group, meaning that when a solution is found
further issues may arise over its implementation. And this is to say nothing of the
potential unforseen consequences of any large-scale decision. Because this research
operates in the context of security, it is appropriate to say that success means the adequate
satisfaction of all parties’ needs in a way that creates, sustains, or opens the door for
peace, a notion that is reflected in the coding. Understanding what peace means in the
context of these interactions is important because it can give insight into the elements of
processes that produce optimal outcomes for all and contribute to success (De Stefano et
al., 2010).

How scholarship and news define peace
Peace is an inherently difficult concept to define (Xuetong, 2004). From the
members of the Penobscot Nation to energy companies in Maine to the governments of
Kazakhstan and Russia, all the different actors I consider in this research have distinct
aims and goals. Realizing those goals represents an important component of each actor’s
strategy or policy in regard to a certain issue. In the context of the Penobscot, the goal of
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the Penobscot Nation was to restore the natural flow of the Penobscot River, a sacred and
culturally important feature of the landscape. We can consider a vastly different example
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s concern over the “‘inefficient use’ of water resources in
the region” by upstream neighboring countries (article Central Asia countries discuss
water at Dushanbe forum). Their goals were to develop cooperative management
practices to mitigate the issue. In both of these cases, however, merely realizing the goals
does not constitute peace; there is nothing that inherently links collective security and the
fulfillment of each individual’s aims.
As demonstrated by the databases of articles, peace is not just the realization of
aims. It is the realization of individual interests in a way that does not impinge on those
of others and supports a nonviolent environment in which actors do not feel they are
threatened by others in the group. It is a collective pursuit (Xuetong, 2004). While peace
may mean something different in each context, it nevertheless exhibits similar features in
regard to how actors pursue it collectively. This notion is substantiated by article related
to both cases. “Success” in articles related to the Aral Sea, for example, emphasizes
acquiescence of personal interests in the name of collective ones. Consider the following
example:

“Uzbekistan does not allow the implementation of plans for construction
of giant dams and large hydropower plants on the tributaries of the Amu
Darya and Syr Darya… These projects can lead to the disruption of the
natural flow of these rivers, further deterioration of the situation with
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water supply in the lower reaches” (Head of delegation of Uzbekistan
makes speech at OSCE Ministerial Council session).

The Penobscot articles are certainly more explicit in their emphasis on give and
take and deference:

“‘It’s important that everybody knows what an uplifting experience it has
been for the tribe to be part of a project where we were given a lot of
deference and our opinions were valued. The cultural aspects of the
Penobscot River were really taken into account,’ Francis said” (a01466).

“[It’s] a little bit of give and take. We need to work with hydroelectric
facilities to come up with reasonable alternatives” (a01396).

In both of these cases, we see a high premium placed on negotiation of interests,
acquiescence, concession, and reconsideration of individual aims in order to better pursue
collective aims. These all point to the conclusion that, in the pursuit for peace and
collective security, actors are often willing to negotiate their interests and the pursuit of
them. It is important to note that I made these observations largely from sections of text
coded with “success” which, therefore, implies that many identify the pursuit and
achievement of collective security as a positive and successful thing. Peace is a collective
ideal.
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Operationalizing Peace as an Outcome or an Ideal
The other side of the coin in this discussion relates to how peace is achieved.
Here, the cases present two contending approaches. In the context of the Penobscot River,
a suitable, successful outcome was achieved for all participants involved. Indeed, the
PRRP is often regarded as a great success, both by observers and participants, for the fact
that it 1) reconciled differences between its constituent groups; 2) achieved desirable
outcomes for both; and 3) contributed toward not just the fulfillment of individual
interests but also regional habitat sustainability. It is not controversial to say that the
project was a success for the people involved, and the tone of nearly every article
overwhelmingly points toward this conclusion. The project had a definite endpoint,
accomplished its original goals of restoring the river through dam removal, and the
parties involved accepted its end result as satisfactory. This notion of success and a
peaceful outcome is different than what the Aral Sea contexts presents us with.
In the second case at hand, peace is not something that has been achieved, at least
not in the timeframe to which the articles were constrained. This implies a different
concept of success and security than the Penobscot River, whose cooperative process at
the time of study was officially completed. The operational definition of peace in this
case must recognize that it is an ideal. Regional security is an aspiration, something
desired. Many articles express this contingency using language that describes the
“potential” of regional actors to figure out collective solutions, the active and continued
presence of problems, and the explication of what steps need to be taken to remediate
them. Consider the following examples as they express uncertainty over future outcomes
and indicate unfulfilled ambitions:
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“Dams — provided they are adequately sized and designed — can
contribute to human development by fighting climate change and
regulating water supply. Yet in a new context of scarcity, upstream
infrastructure projects on international rivers may impact water quality or
availability for neighboring states, thus causing tensions” (Climate change
raises threat of water wars).

“Kazakhstan is considering the possibility of determining the
establishment of mechanisms for monitoring and preventive responses to
environmental threats as measures to strengthen regional security”
(Kazakhstan’s chairmanship to OSCE is chance for country to contribute
to strengthening regional and…).

“Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon attended the event. He
expressed the confidence that the realization of these goals and tasks is
possible only if cooperation and mobilization of the necessary resources
— human, financial and scientific — is enhanced” (Water management —
greatest challenge for Central Asian nations).

In the first example, there is much uncertainty over potential outcomes, and the author
implies that conflict may exist in the future. This both indicates that peace has not been
achieved and that there are active issues that regional actors are attempting to resolve.
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The second excerpt summarizes Kazakhstan’s plans to innovate problem-solving
techniques. In the third, the author notes statements made by the Tajik president that
major collective goals are unfulfilled. These selections of text exemplify an overall tone
in the Aral Sea articles that indicates uncertainty about future outcomes. The major
takeaway is that, at the time of investigation, the countries of the region has not attained a
relative state of collective security or peace. They do, however, desire to achieve this, and
as such the articles related to the Aral Sea detail numerous forums, discussions, treaties,
and instances of national representatives ranking “cooperation” as something their
nations would like to engage in or maintain.
If we compare the function of collective security — peace — as a desired
outcome, we are met with two different conclusions. In case of the Penobscot, the
outcomes of a decision-making process, the PRRP, are visible and in many respects
major decision making has ended. In the Aral Sea case, there was no such organized and
successful decision-making process as the PRRP, and because of that a collective desired
outcome has not been achieved. It is possible that this latter form is a more common one
for interactions around shared natural resources. It is rare in international affairs that a
regional decision-making process results in a success that all, including those who were
not directly involved, find totally adequate. There is always give and take, concession and
acquiescence. It is for this reason that many see the Penobscot context as an outlier, an
innovation in collaboration. One of the major emphasis of the articles related to this
context is this very notion that such success as we saw on the Penobscot River had never
been achieved before in similar conditions. We must take this fact into account when
evaluating the role of peace and collective security as a driving force in decision-making,
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the goal everyone is working toward. It is therefore possible that the Aral Sea context
includes a more traditional form of peace, because peace in many cases is not necessarily
a realistic expectation. Instead, as the Aral Sea case demonstrates, the very process of
trying to achieve peace can yield positive results for collective security, even if a finite
result is not achieved (as it was in the PRRP). Treaties and forums can represent
milestones along this road toward the ideal. Rarely, however, are they as terminal as in
the case of the Penobscot.
In this section, I discussed two major elements of peace: its collective nature and
role as an ideal in decision-making. Based on articles related to both cases at hand, I
came to the conclusion that peace must be thought of as something achieved through
concession, negotiation, and acquiescence. In other words, trying to achieve peace is not
necessarily the same as trying to achieve national interests. Peace involves the pursuit of
individual interests in a way that supports collective security, and because these two
things may at times be at odds it also involves negotiation. On the other side, I noticed a
distinct difference in the operationalization of collective security and peace in decisionmaking processes in both cases. In the Penobscot context, peace was an ideal over the
nearly 20-year duration of the PRRP, and many believe that this ideal manifested in a
tangible outcome at the end. Peace was achieved. This is evidenced by the fact that nearly
everyone considered the project a landmark success in collaboration to achieve collective
interests. I argue that a major element of these collective interests — and subsequently a
major aim of the project — was to achieve a sense of collective security in the context of
the river basin. On the other side of the globe, the Aral Sea articles demonstrate a more
traditional form of peace in decision making processes. Peace is abstract and hard to pin
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down; it is difficult for us to judge when a decision was motivated by a desire for
collective peace. However, in the context of the Aral Sea it is clear that nations have
made many decisions based on the prospect of achieving national security through the
avenue of collective security. (Similarly, they have historically made many self-interested
decisions with less regard for the interests of others.) Because the very emphasis of the
PRRP is on its role as a precedent-setting project with the potential to set the tone for
future collaborations, we can assume that its success is distinct and not inherently
representative of wider trends. If we consider the idea of collective security to be a
desirable outcome for actors involved in a decision-making process, then we may need to
look toward the Aral Sea for how that ambition has been historically operationalized and
toward the Penobscot for how it may be operationalized in the future.

How do these cooperations advance peaceful outcomes for water security?
Now that I have established some general insights into the nature of
collaborations in these two cases, and an operational definition of peace as a desired and
achieved outcome, I will attempt to describe some of the different ways that actors in
these two cases achieve peace. To understand how these cooperations can advance
peaceful outcomes for water security, we can look at elements of success. In both the
Penobscot and Aral Sea contexts, we seem similar trends related to how different actors
cooperate. I begin by describing the fundamental state of cooperation necessary for a
positive outcome; then I describe how it is important to reconcile differences in power,
what framework successful negotiations should take place in, and how nations make
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difficult tradeoffs between environmental, economic, and energy interests. This is not an
exhaustive list of the ingredients needed for a successful cooperation, but it does
represent some of the most visible that came through in the process of coding.
Cooperation and power dynamics

A high level of cooperation and low level of conflict in a decision-making process
will lead to more successful outcomes. This is an intuitive point but one that deserves
some treatment. Articles from both the Aral Sea and Penobscot contexts substantiate this
idea and indicate time and time again that cooperation is a real benefit to achieving
desired outcomes. Cooperation in this context is a baseline necessity to come to any sort
of collectively desirable outcome. If one party is not consulted in the decision-making
process, then that party’s interests will not be considered. Both of the cases I dealt with
involved a high degree of inclusivity in terms of who was allowed a seat at the table.
Nowhere in either database did I see indications of contempt or frustration over a group
not being included in making decisions. While such issues were not present in these
cases, one might imagine that this kind of exclusivity presents a real issue in some other
decision-making process over natural resources. For now, one should note that the cases I
analyze here do involve a high level of basic cooperation in that all parties have the
ability to take part in the decision-making process, something that should not be taken as
a universal norm.
The political geographies of the Aral Sea and Penobscot River are unique. In both
cases, there were or are strong power dynamics between the different actors of the area,
with the most successful outcomes being achieved when these power dynamics were
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explicitly negotiated in the process of collaboration. The Penobscot context presents us
with the clearest example of this between the numerous different actors of the PRRP,
including federal regulators, conservationists, citizens, hydropower companies, and the
Penobscot Nation. In particular, this last group faced the greatest historically disparity in
levels of efficacy and power going into the project. This is evidenced by numerous codes
in the Penobscot database which describe the tribe’s unfulfilled goals and disadvantages.

“For a century, the Penobscot Indian Nation has been unable to exercise
its tribal fishing rights to catch fish such as Atlantic salmon because the
river is virtually devoid of native sea-run fish. In various treaties, the tribe
retained the right to subsistence fish for salmon and other species that are
otherwise illegal to harvest” (a00981).

“[The Penobscot Nation’s] complaints went unheeded, even when
thousands of shad and alewives the following spring lingered about the
new dam and died there, filling the air with a powerful stench” (a01083).

“In 1833, when a dam was built at Veazie for the first time to power a
sawmill, the Penobscot Indians protested that the dam would destroy the
annual runs of salmon and other sea-run fish” (a01083).

The articles frame the nature of the relationship between the Penobscot Nation and
powers companies as one of opposing interests. The power companies built dams, the
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Penobscot Nation vocally opposed them, but at the end of the day it was the former who
won out. We see that a major element of the success of the project was its ability to level
these power differences between various actors, represented in the Penobscot Nation’s
vocal exuberance at the outcomes of the project and the articles’ emphasis on bringing
everyone to the table for discussions as equals:

“Restoration advocates said the changes were a first step toward a new
balance between energy and ecology on the river” (a00447).

“It’s truly a win-win situation for PPL, for the Penobscot Indian Nation,
for people and businesses that will benefit from a restored fish run, and for
the environment” (a00556).

Creating a successful outcome for the PRRP, then, was both about having a cooperative
framework within which to negotiate and an establishing an unprecedented level of
equality in decision making for all parties involved. The idea that such a dynamic leads to
success when dealing with multiple parties with varied interests can also be ascertained
through Aral Sea articles.
I have already established that negotiation over natural resources in the region of
the Aral Sea is an active processes; even today nations continue to plan for the future and
craft new policy in the hopes of achieving collectively desired outcomes. While the
Penobscot context presents an example of how a decision-making process can equalize
power levels, the Aral Sea can provide an example of the effects of uneven between
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actors, particularly in how the geography of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers creates
a complex power imbalance between the upstream states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
and the downstream states of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. One of the greatest issues
riparian states face is this issue of power imbalance between upstream and downstream
states, and the problem arises in the Aral Sea context because upstream states’ policies
have implications for those downstream but not vice versa (Mirumachi and Allan, 2010).
Some articles emphasize this point as an important factor:

“Both upstream countries, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, want to build major
power plants on these rivers to boost their ailing economies. But
downstream states, most notably Uzbekistan, fear that huge dams of the
power facilities will aggravate water shortage in their territory and carry
the risk of flooding border areas” (Central Asia countries discuss water
cooperation at Dushanbe Forum).

One should note that the power disparities between the nations of the Aral Sea region are
not drastic. In fact, I noticed a significant amount of discussions in international forums
and other multilateral discussions. It could be that these geographically influenced
imbalances even encourage Central Asian countries to hold many multilateral forums.
The dynamics of power were different in the Penobscot and Aral Sea contexts. In
the former, all actors were given equal access to the decision-making process and they
enjoyed a high level of efficacy. The Aral Sea context represents a process where some
nations have an inherent advantage over others due to their geography and there is a high
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level of cooperation; yet nations of the region understand that much work is left to be
done toward achieving their collective goals. Because of these insights, it is possible to
say that a major element of successful outcomes is the ability of constituent actors to
negotiate and navigate their differing levels of power so that everyone has a roughly
equal effective ability to influence decision making. It is important that all of this occurs
in a framework of multilateral cooperation, the next element of success I will address.

Multilateral frameworks as elements of success
When talking about cooperation, it is important to identify the type of framework
being used for decision-making. In international relations, states make decisions amongst
themselves on a bilateral or multilateral basis, with the former involving two actors and
the latter involving more than two. In the Aral Sea and Penobscot contexts, it was
important that negotiations in both cases took place in a framework of multilateral
cooperation, whether it was an international summit of heads of state or a meeting of the
Penobscot Trust and its partners. The United Nations — the world’s largest multilateral
intergovernmental organization — is also a significant player in sustainability talks in
Central Asia. It is important to recognize that nations here also pursue bilateral
agreements, particularly business partnerships and specific economic treaties; however, it
is the simultaneous presence of other multilateral decision-making institutions that
allowed these countries to pursue collective goals. In both the Aral Sea and Penobscot
contexts, making decisions through multilateral organizations or forums proved to be a
crucial element of success for the case of the Penobscot and continues to sustain
cooperation among the nations of the Aral Sea region.
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Balancing tradeoffs
The final element of success I observed relates to different parties’ ability to
reconcile what I perceived as major tradeoffs in sustainability decision making:
environmental health energy production. These two things represent some of the
strongest sources of conflict in both cases. It often seemed that environmental health was
identified as something that inherently opposed economic and energy interests such that
finding a solution required an innovative solution or reprioritization. When tradeoffs were
balanced, actors tended to see the outcome of the entire process as favorable. Consider
the following text taken from coded Penobscot River and Aral sea articles, respectively:

“When the river’s dams were built in the 1800s, Opperman said, the
builders never thought about balancing energy production and habitat by
taking a view of the entire river basin. As a result, the river has
experienced massive declines in populations of sea-run fish such as
salmon” (a00916).

“Kazakhstan was forced to make concessions and purchase
electricity from Kyrgyzstan together with water in order to
normalise the spillway of the Syr Darya, but additional volumes
were lost in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan who did not fulfill
its commitments to the passage of water to Kazakhstan” (China
compounding Kazakhstan’s water woes).
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The first quote highlights how energy production and environmental protection appear to
be at odds in the Penobscot context, where these interests were eventually balanced
through the PRRP. Negotiating tradeoffs in the case of the Penobscot meant increasing
hydropower generation at other dams while some on the river were demolished to restore
habitat. The second quote shows how the same theme applies to the Aral Sea context
where energy and the environment are entangled issues; alterations to one can affect the
other. I observed these themes across both databases. In terms of outcomes, I argue that
the Penobscot is considered such a success in part because of its ability to reconcile these
“opposing” interests and find a solution equitable to all. Conversely, nations of the Aral
Sea region, I believe, are still trying to find that balance between hydropower production
and environmental health. They may be moving in the right direction and enjoying
milestone successes in the form of piecewise agreements, treaties, and partnerships, but a
finite success like the kind that the PRRP achieved is a long way off.

Conclusion
In this section, I attempted to identify some of the strongest themes that I saw
emerge from the coding based on research questions I established at the outset of this
project. In regard to my first research question — How do international cooperations
focused on water security work? — I attempted to characterize the nature of cooperations
in the two cases I chose to compare for this study. I found some general consistencies
across both cases but also key differences that highlight larger trends. Next, I attempted
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to determine an operational definition of peace based on the articles. If we consider peace
— a word I use somewhat interchangeable with “collective security” — to mean the
pursuit of individual interests in a way that maintains a healthy, non-threatening, and safe
environment, then it is possible to clearly identify elements that contribute to the creation
of peaceful outcomes which are nearly always regarded as successes. The question of
how actors achieve these positive and peaceful outcomes in situations of natural resource
security was something I wanted to learn more about at the outset of this project, and in
the final section of my analysis I attempted to identify some feature of collaborations
around the Aral Sea and Penobscot River that tended to contribute to this ideal. Such
knowledge is important because it can inform policy and help us pinpoint failures of a
decision-making process. The PRRP may be finished and the Penobscot River in a state
of relative content, its collaboration and tradeoff-balancing mission having been a great
success, but the actors of the Aral Sea region are certainly still in search of their peaceful
outcome, their river restoration project on a much wider scale. In the future they may find
an answer and manage to balance their sometimes-contentious interests, but for now it
appears that the sheer number or actors, size of populations, and sense of high stakes
makes a coherent, collective solution a distant dream.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION

Two of my most formative experiences as an undergraduate were my studies in
international security and my job as a research assistant for the Future of Dams Project.
With this project, I wanted to synthesize these two important but until now unrelated
ventures. I chose to compare two regional contexts — the Penobscot River and the Aral
Sea — and analyze them along the dimensions of cooperation. I hoped this cross-case
study would allow me to combine my work in sustainability research with my studies of
political science and teach me more about the nature of collaborations in a sub-category
of international affairs I may not have otherwise had a reason to look into. This research
proved to be an incredibly valuable personal endeavor, and it yielded interesting insights
into my chosen topic.
At the outset of this project, I established three research questions: 1) How do
international cooperations focused on water security work? 2) What, in the context of
international cooperations focused on water security, does peace mean? 3) How do these
cooperations advance peaceful outcomes for water security? These questions guided my
creation of a codebook to organize and analyze over 140 articles combined about the
Penobscot River and Aral Sea. The Penobscot articles cover a period of roughly 20 years,
from 1996 to 2016, when the PRRP ended. I restricted the frame of time from which Aral
Sea articles were selected to match this. In addition to similar time frames, I organized
my databases of using similar search terms related to cooperation and water and a similar
number of articles, with the intention of giving equal treatment to each set. This was all
done with the intention of creating parallel conditions in which to analyze the articles.
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My codebook was designed around my desires for the research and substantiated from
insights from the literature and a previous codebook I used for a media discourse analysis
about dam removal in Maine. After a process of refining, I ended up with the following
10 codes: “Challenges,” “Cooperation,” “Conflict,” “Codified agreements,” “Failure,”
“Leadership,” “Contingency,” “Infrastructure,” “Management,” and “Success.” This
codebook was tailored to my personal research questions and influenced by insights from
literature and a previous discourse analysis I did of dam removal in Maine. From this, I
managed to draw some general themes about the nature of collaborations, success in
decision making, and elements of peaceful outcomes in my analysis sections.
My three principal research questions formed the skeleton of my analysis. To lay
the foundation of my analysis, I began by trying to characterize the nature of
collaborations in these two cases, finding evidence to support scholarly research on the
coexistence of cooperation and conflict in decision-making processes. I also found that,
in these two cases, cooperation is operationalized differently in news articles, with those
related to the Penobscot describing it as a past achievement and those related to the Aral
Sea describing it as an ideal. Additionally, infrastructure can be an opportunity to
collaborate but largely serves as a source of friction. The next section of my analysis
dealt with establishing a definition of peace — which was often found to be a desired
outcome when considering collective aims — so that I could analyze the elements of
successful projects. I found that successful decision-making processes — the PRRP and
to a lesser extent Aral Sea cooperation — shared some similar features: inclusion for all
parties, successful negotiation of differences in power, multilateral frameworks, and
reconciliation of environmental and energy tradeoffs.
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This process was not without its challenges, and the limitations I ran into related
both to my methods and subjects of study. In regard to the first point, I found an issue
that arose with the method of coding. Some of the coding I did on Penobscot articles was
from a previous batch of coding for a different project, one for which we used line coding
instead of paragraph coding. Going into this project, I did not anticipate any issues with
drawing connections between line coding and paragraph coding because what I was
focusing on was not quantitative but qualitative results (meaning I was using the coding
more for organization’s sake to arrange similar themes in the text rather than looking for
frequency of codes or any other numerical result, although those were also accounted for
in chapter four). Due to this disparity in the scale of coding, I ended up with many more
results for some codes than others (this can be seen in comparing the “success” code
between the Penobscot [249 instances] and the Aral Sea [39 instances]). While I did not
anticipate leaning too heavily on the quantitative results, it nevertheless felt like I may
have been able to make more inferences based on frequency of codes and similar results
had I been more confident in the way they had been applied.
Since 2016, many have argued that we need to reconsider the notion that the
PRRP was a success. The fish have not come back in the numbers that experts expected
during and at the conclusion of the project. One newspaper article from the Bangor Daily
News in April, 2019, reported on biologists’ efforts to stock salmon smolts in the
Piscataquis River, a tributary of the Penobscot River, to “bolster restoration efforts”
(Holyoke, 2019). In this way, my selection of dates from which to compile articles —
which ended at 2016 — may not be reflective of more immediate, pressing trends in the
Penobscot basin. The question of whether the PRRP was a success is being reconsidered
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every day as new information comes to light. While the project may have ended in 2016,
its effects are only starting to be felt, and researchers will continue to analyze river
conditions for years to come. Because of this, new qualitative analyses that consider
articles from after Jan. 1, 2017, may provide information that can allow us to develop a
more nuanced and truthful sense of success for the Penobscot context. Future research
might look to update this thesis by increasing its methodological scope.
The other major limitations of this work have to do with the cases I chose. It is
quite obvious that the Penobscot and Aral Sea contexts are incredibly different in the
scales on which they operate, the types of actors involved, and the geographic, cultural,
political, and economic idiosyncrasies of the regions. Still, I wanted to see what kind of
unique insights I could find by comparing two projects that do not seem like they should
be compared. Treating both as international processes due to the Penobscot Nation’s
status as a semi-sovereign nation and similarities in the kinds of interactions in the PRRP
and around the Aral Sea, I believe that I accomplished my goal and discovered valuable
connections between the two. However, the differences between these two projects seems
to raise more meta questions than can be answered in this thesis about how we should
compare things that are not similar. This kind of cross-case study is, to my knowledge,
rare, and as such there is not a lot of information regarding the kinds of techniques one
should use and conseriations one needs to make in conducting such research.
Despite these challenges, I believe that I produced some insights into the nature of
international collaborations around shared resources that could be tested against other
cases. Indeed, more work is needed to see if the trends I observed between the Penobscot
and Central Asia are merely coincidence or indicative or more universal propensities in
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cooperative processes. Future research could aim to do a few things. First, it could hold
up these results to other case studies from around the globe and see what trends emerge.
After this, it could attempt to create an operational definition of peace that fits not only
the two cases discussed here but the majority of cases of natural resource decision
making. Finally, more research is needed into how we should compare projects that take
place on different scales. Future case studies will need a theoretical framework that
incorporates economic, political, and social factors and prescribes methods to use and
considerations to make when scaling observations up or down from one case study to
another. This allows for more effective comparisons and more holistic results, things that
are crucial if the style of this research is ever to be emulated again.
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